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PROMISE DESPITE OVERREACH IN
MARSHALL ISLANDS V. UNITED STATES
Katherine Maddox Davis
ABSTRACT
When it comes to accountability for treaty obligations, the International
Court of Justice has not proved as impactful as its founders hoped. Given that
shortcoming, domestic courts’ role in determining treaty obligations is critical.
This Essay contends that treaty parties may have hope in federal court for
declaratory relief regarding American treaty obligations. The inspiration
comes from Marshall Islands v. United States, currently before the Ninth
Circuit. The Marshall Islands sued the United States for breach of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty Article VI, requesting declaratory and injunctive
relief. This Essay deconstructs the Marshall Islands' strategy, pronounces its
impending demise, and reimagines how the strategy could succeed if limited to
declaratory relief. When a treaty party sufficiently pleads injury-in-fact in a
proper venue, the Essay posits that redress, political question, and non-selfexecuting treaty status may not bar a declaratory judgment.
INTRODUCTION
While it is novel for a foreign sovereign to consent to the jurisdiction
of U.S. federal courts over a treaty dispute, it is in no way novel for
the U.S. federal courts to interpret a treaty and/or to find a treaty
violation. Indeed, in the first fifty years of U.S. constitutional history,
between 1789 and 1838, the Supreme Court decided nineteen cases
in which the U.S. government was a party, at least one party raised a
claim or defense on the basis of a treaty, and the Court decided the
merits of that claim or defense.
–Marshall Islands Complaint for Breach of the Nuclear Non1
Proliferation Treaty


Law Clerk, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. J.D., Emory University School of
Law; M.Sc., University of Oxford; B.A., Auburn University. The author thanks professors Johan van der
Vyver and Jonathan Nash for their helpful feedback, and the EILR Executive Board for their able editing. This
Essay continues commentary begun in Hurting More than Helping: How the Marshall Islands’ Seeming
Bravery Against Major Powers Only Stands to Maim the Legitimacy of the World Court, 25 MINN. J. INT’L L.
79 (2016).
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The United States (U.S.) is subject to robust criticism for exceptionalism in
public international law.2 When it comes to accountability in treaty obligations,
whether for the United States or other major powers, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) has not proven as impactful as its founders hoped.3 Given that
shortcoming, domestic courts’ role in determining treaty obligations is all the
more critical.4
This Essay contends that treaty parties may have hope in federal court for
declaratory relief regarding American treaty obligations. The inspiration for
this Essay is taken from a case currently before the Ninth Circuit, Marshall
Islands v. United States.5 The Marshall Islands filed a complaint against the
United States for breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Article
VI, requesting both declaratory and injunctive relief.6 As quoted above, the
Marshall Islands points out that this strategy is far from novel in American
jurisprudence and only need be dusted from a few centuries’ dormancy.7 This
Essay deconstructs Marshall Islands, pronounces its impending demise, and
reimagines how the legal strategy could succeed if limited to declaratory relief.
Where a treaty party can sufficiently plead injury in fact, this Essay posits that

1 Complaint at 1–2, Republic of the Marshall Islands v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1068 (N.D. Cal.
2015) (No. 3:14-CV-01885-JSW).
2 Katherine M. Davis, I, Too, Sing America: Customary International Law for American State and
Federal Courts’ Post-Kiobel Jurisprudence, Guided by Australian and Indian Experiences, 29 EMORY INT’L
L. REV. 119, 123 (2014) [hereinafter Davis, I, Too, Sing America]. By contrast, matters of private international
law seem to be ushered into federal courts with more grace. See, e.g., BG Group plc v. Republic of Argentina,
134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014).
3 Katherine Maddox Davis, Hurting More than Helping: How the Marshall Islands’ Seeming Bravery
Against Major Powers Only Stands to Maim the Legitimacy of the World Court, 25 MINN. J. INT’L L. 79, 98–
100 (2016) [hereinafter Davis, Hurting More than Helping]; see also A. MARK WEISBURD, FAILINGS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 3 (2015) (“[A] contradiction between the significance for international law
accorded to the I.C.J.’s decisions by tribunals and scholars and the formal authority accorded to the Court in its
Statute.”); infra Part I.B.
4 See Davis, Hurting More than Helping, supra note 3, at 88; Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and
Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 469 (2005) (“[D]omestic
enforcement mechanisms are a crucial force pushing countries to comply with international treaties . . . .”).
There is also a growing awareness of the broader interplay between federal courts and the international
community. See, e.g., CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM, at xi (2d ed.
2015); STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD 197 (2015).
5 See Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal at 1–2, Republic of the Marshall Islands v. United States, 79 F. Supp.
3d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 14-CV-01885-JSW).
6 See Complaint, supra note 1, at 27; infra Part II.
7 See Complaint, supra note 1, at 1–2; see also Oona A. Hathaway et al., International Law at Home:
Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 51, 88–89 (2012) (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984)).
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redress, political question, and non-self-executing treaty status may not bar a
declaratory judgment.
In April 2014, the Republic of the Marshall Islands sued each of the nine
nuclear weapons states at the ICJ for failure to comply with Article VI of the
NPT.8 Article VI requires the pursuit of good faith negotiations toward
proliferation cessation and further negotiations toward disarmament.9 The
Marshall Islands brought an additional suit against the United States in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California.10 The case was dismissed
and appealed.11
The Marshall Islands’ ICJ actions garnered little attention; interested
parties realize that a decision is likely years away.12 Meager attention is
equally attributable to the suits’ potential. Only three nuclear weapons states
submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.13 Of those three, only one is
party to the NPT.14 The legal grounds against the other two countries are based
on an attenuated argument of customary international law that is unlikely to

8 James Conca, The Nuclear Weapons States—Who Has Them and How Many, FORBES (Sept. 25, 2014,
10:54 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2014/09/25/the-nuclear-weapons-states-who-has-themand-how-many/. The nuclear states are the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia, India,
Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. Id.
9 See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. VI, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729
U.N.T.S. 161.
10 See Complaint, supra note 1, at 1. In its Complaint, the Marshall Islands named the United States,
President Barack Obama, the Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense Charles Hagel, the Department of
Energy, Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz, and the National Nuclear Security Administration. See id. The U.S.
Department of Justice Civil Division, Federal Programs Section and Appellate Section filed on behalf of the
collective government defendants before the district and appellate courts, respectively. This Essay refers to the
defendants collectively as “the Government” and “the United States.” See Press Release, Int’l Court of Justice,
The Republic of the Marshall Islands Files Applications Against Nine States for Their Alleged Failure to
Fulfill Their Obligations with Respect to the Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race at an Early Date and to
Nuclear Disarmament, Press Release No. 2014/18 (Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/files/0/
18300.pdf [hereinafter Press Release No. 2014/18]. See generally Republic of the Marshall Islands v. United
States, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Brief of Appellee, Republic of the Marshall Islands v. United
States, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2015 Oct. 28, 2015) (No. 4:14-CV-01885-JSW).
11 Republic of the Marshall Islands, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1068; Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal at 1–2, Republic of
the Marshall Islands v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2015 Apr. 2, 2015) (No. 4:14-CV01885-JSW).
12 Indeed, the ICJ gave India a year to respond, and the Marshall Islands six months to respond on
whether the ICJ’s jurisdiction in the matter is proper. See Davis, Hurting More than Helping, supra note 3, at
85.
13 See Press Release No. 2014/18, supra note 10.
14 See id.
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gain traction.15 While the Marshall Islands’ complaint in federal court received
sparse attention, the American case merits exploration.
Regardless of the Marshall Islands’ near-certain failure, the broader legal
strategy has the potential to reinvigorate a trend of treaty parties seeking
declaratory judgments from federal courts.16 Such judgments could mark a
meaningful step toward American accountability by defining U.S. treaty
obligations and determining compliance. Nations seeking to press for
American treaty compliance can extract a roadmap of valuable lessons from
Marshall Islands v. United States.
This Essay proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a background to the NPT
and dispenses of the Marshall Islands’ cases before the ICJ, explaining their
futility and the resulting value of efforts to seek U.S. treaty compliance
through American courts. Part II explores the Marshall Islands’ suit in
American federal court, highlighting redress, political question doctrine, and
non-self-executing treaty status as sticking points barring declaratory relief.
Part III posits that when only declaratory relief is sought, those three sticking
points are not clear bars to other sovereigns seeking to have a U.S. court
interpret American treaty obligations. Concluding remarks reiterate the need
for good faith efforts to quell American exceptionalism in public international
law. This Essay will not address the value of nuclear weapons arsenals
themselves, though acknowledging the great weight of that matter—
particularly as the United States updates its nuclear arsenal.17 Likewise, venue
will not be addressed: the matter will generally be as simple as filing in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.18 While the Marshall Islands
are unlikely to see victory in the case at bar, the litigation stands to crack open
a long-buried method of American treaty accountability.
I. THE ICJ AND NPT WERE BORN OF FOREIGN RELATIONS COMPROMISES
THAT LEFT THEM WEAK TO ENFORCE AND BE ENFORCED, RAISING THE
VALUE OF DOMESTIC PROCEEDINGS
In 1968, some twenty-three years after the world’s first nuclear weapons
were tested in New Mexico, the five then-existing nuclear weapons states and a
15

See Davis, Hurting More than Helping, supra note 3, at 83.
See Complaint, supra note 1, at 1–2.
17 See William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, As U.S. Modernizes Nuclear Weapons, ‘Smaller’ Leaves
Some Uneasy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2016, at A1.
18 See infra Part III.
16
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bounty of non-weapons states recognized the NPT.19 The treaty came into
force in 1970.20 The NPT reflected a worldwide agreement to cease building
new nuclear weaponry and begin exploring avenues toward creating a new
treaty for strict disarmament.21 At the time of the NPT, five victors of World
War II had tested and possessed nuclear weapons.22 Over time, India, Israel,
Pakistan, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea developed and tested
nuclear weapons, though the NPT made no allowances for other nations to be
officially deemed nuclear weapons states.23
As the NPT drafters knew, one does not simply end an arms race. The longsuffering language of Article VI called for the parties to “undertake[] to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the
nuclear arms race at an early date.”24 Further complicating matters not fully
appreciated at the time of the NPT’s drafting, disarming nuclear weapons can
be more expensive and time-intensive than developing them.25 Given the sheer
overwhelming cost of nuclear disarmament, the demands of Article VI are

19 REBECCA JOHNSON, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: THE NEGOTIATION OF THE CTBT AND THE END OF
NUCLEAR TESTING 1 (2009). As of 1968, the five nuclear weapons states were China, France, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. at 2.
20 Id.
21 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 9, art. VI (“Each of the Parties to the
Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith . . . on a treaty on general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control.”).
22 See id.; Nobuyasu Abe, The Current Problems of the NPT: How to Strengthen the Non-Proliferation
Regime, in THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY AND INDIA 38 (Rajiv Nayan ed., 2012).
23 Conca, supra note 8. Because the NPT restricts the title of “nuclear weapons state” to those states who
tested weapons prior to January 1, 1967, none of the four latecomers were able to join the NPT as weapons
states. Most have chosen not to join as non-weapons states. Abe, supra note 22, at 38. Notably, India pushed
firmly against the delineation between nuclear weapons haves and have nots, now holding a peculiar space as
an American-embraced nuclear state not recognized by the NPT. See KATE SULLIVAN, S. RAJARATNAM SCH.
OF INT’L STUDIES, POLICY REPORT: IS INDIA A RESPONSIBLE NUCLEAR POWER? 1 (2014),
http://oxford.academia.edu/KateSullivan.
24 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 9, art VI.
25 Walter Pincus, The Explosive Cost of Disposing of Nuclear Weapons, WASH. POST (July 3, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-explosive-cost-of-disposing-of-nuclear-weapons/
2013/07/03/64f896e0-e287-11e2-80eb-3145e2994a55_story.html. In current value, four atomic bombs
developed by the World War II Manhattan Project cost $24.1 billion to develop and six years to build. Those
bombs were “the Trinity plutonium implosion device tested in the New Mexico desert; the Little Boy uranium
bomb dropped on Hiroshima; the Fat Man plutonium bomb that hit Nagasaki, and an unused uranium bomb.”
Id. By contrast, the U.S. government’s proposed allocation for blending the leftover 37.5 tons of plutonium, to
render it unusable in further nuclear weaponry, is $24.2 billion. Id. The blending process is estimated to take
more than two decades. Id.
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rightfully tempered.26 Even so, most nuclear weapons states may well argue
that they are in compliance with the spirit and letter of Article VI.27
A. Worldwide Compliance with the Broad Language of NPT Article VI is
Arguable, and the Marshall Islands Hardly Made Waves at NPT Meetings
in 2014 and 2015
The Marshall Islands contends that Article VI has received insufficient
attention since the NPT came into force.28 To whatever degree discussing the
matter is “pursuing negotiations,” compliance by most NPT parties is
arguable.29 Since 1975, in accordance with the NPT provisions, NPT Review
Conferences are held every five years to assess compliance and look toward
potential future action.30 Three Preparatory Committee meetings are held
between conferences.31 The most recent Preparatory Committee meeting
occurred in New York City from April 28 through May 9, 2014, one week
after the Marshall Islands filed its suits.32 While some opined that the timing of
the lawsuit was a possible attempt to “put the question of the legality of
nuclear arsenals on the agenda at the Preparatory Committee meetings,”33 and
a blog post by civil society leaders noted that the Marshall Islands Prime
Minister received an “unprecedented outburst of resounding applause” at the
Preparatory Committee plenary, the records of the 2014 meetings contain no
mention of the suits.34 Curiously, no national report appears to have been
26

See ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 86 (2014) (regarding treaties generally,
“the problem is not so much that states violate treaty terms but that the treaties do not create any meaningful
obligations”).
27 In a realistic (if cynical) perspective, “when legal rules are vague, one can easily argue that one
complied with them even when one’s conduct does not seem to advance the underlying purpose of the
rules . . . .” Id.
28 See generally Complaint, supra note 1.
29 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 9, art. VI.
30 For a record of past Review Conferences and Preparatory committees, see NPT Review Conferences
and Preparatory Committees, www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT_Review_Conferences.shtml
(last visited Mar. 13, 2016).
31 See id.
32 Id.
33 Avner Cohen & Lily Vaccaro, The Import of the Marshall Islands Nuclear Lawsuit, BULL. ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS (May 6, 2014, 11:42 AM), http://thebulletin.org/import-marshall-islands-nuclear-lawsuit7143.
34 Open Letter in Support of the Marshall Islands’ Nuclear Zero Lawsuits, NUCLEAR AGE PEACE FOUND.
(Nov. 4, 2014), www.wagingpeace.org/rmi-open-letter/; Cohen & Vaccaro, supra note 33 (“While a number of
nongovernmental organizations have been vocal about the lawsuit, especially at NPT Preparatory Committee
side events, the delegations participating in the conference have remained all but silent on the subject.”); see
also Preparatory Comm. for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, Summary Record of the 3rd Meeting, UN Doc. NPT/CONF.2015/PC.111/Sr.3 (Apr. 29,
2014) (not mentioning the Marshall Islands at all, let alone the Marshall Islands participating in debate);
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submitted by the Marshall Islands.35 The 2015 Review Conference was
contentious; leaders left without agreeing to so much as a final culminating
document.36
Whether correlated to the Review Conferences, or actualized in a spirit of
compliance with the NPT, the total quantity of nuclear weapons possessed by
the nine nuclear weapons states is ninety percent lower today than it was
during the Cold War.37 This reality detracts from the Marshall Islands’
contention that Article VI compliance is inadequate.38
B. The Marshall Islands’ ICJ Proceedings are Futile at Best, and May
Damage the Court’s Legitimacy.
When it comes to encouraging further American implementation of the
NPT, the value of the proceedings in American courts is enhanced by the low
likelihood of any productivity before the ICJ.39 Because the United States does
not submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, the filing against America
is essentially dead on arrival.40

Preparatory Comm. for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, Recommendations by the Chair to the 2015 NPT Review Conference, UN Doc
NPT/CONF.2015/PC.111/WP.46 (May 8, 2014) (not mentioning the Marshall Islands).
35 While plenty of nations filed reports that are now available on the U.N. website, no such report is
available from the Marshall Islands. For a list of the current reports, see 2015 Review Conference of the
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), UNITED NATIONS
www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT2015/PrepCom2014/documents.shtml (last visited Feb. 16,
2016) [hereinafter 2015 Review Conference].
36 2015 Review Conference, supra note 35 (“At the 2015 NPT Review Conference, States parties
examined the implementation of the Treaty’s provisions since 2010. Despite intensive consultations, the
Conference was not able to reach agreement on the substantive part of the draft Final Document.”).
37 Conca, supra note 8 (“Presently, there are nine nuclear weapons states with about 10,000 weapons,
down dramatically from the 100,000 at the height of the Cold War: Russia: 5,000; U.S.: 4,400; France: 290;
China: 240; U.K.: 195; Israel: 80; Pakistan: 200; India: 150; DPRK: ~ 6.”).
38 A further case for American compliance with NPT Article VI—prior to the Clinton administration, the
NPT was periodically renewed at each Review Conference. See Miles A. Pomper, Previewing the 2010
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, in THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND
INDIA 51–52 (Rajiv Nayan ed., 2012). The NPT was renewed indefinitely as a result of the Clinton
administration’s leadership. Id.
39 See Davis, Hurting More than Helping, supra note 3, at 88.
40 See Press Release No. 2014/18, supra note 10.
In accordance with Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, the Applications of the
Republic of the Marshall Islands have been transmitted to the six Governments concerned
[China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, France, Israel, the Russian Federation and
the United States]. Unless and until consent is given to the Court’s jurisdiction, there is no case to
be entered in the General List.
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Historically, seeking to hold the United States accountable before the ICJ
for its failure to implement international law has been a game of whack-amole.41 When the ICJ ruled against the United States in Nicaragua v. United
States in 1986, the United States withdrew its submission to the ICJ’s
compulsory jurisdiction.42 And after the ICJ ruled against the United States in
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals in 2004, the United States withdrew from
the Vienna Convention’s Optional Protocol submitting to ICJ jurisdiction for
consular disputes.43 Many consider this posture itself as an American failure to
implement international law.44 Whatever company is worth, the United States
has some.
Of the nine nuclear weapons states, only the United Kingdom, India, and
Pakistan still submit to the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction.45 France withdrew
its submission before the ICJ had a chance to rule in New Zealand v. France, a
decade prior to the withdrawal of the United States.46 China withdrew as well,
and Russia never submitted to begin with.47 Neither North Korea nor Israel
currently submits.48

Id.
41

See Davis, Hurting More than Helping, supra note 3, at 106–07.
See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986
I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 292 (June 27); JOHAN D. VAN DER VYVER, IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES 133–34 (2010).
43 See Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T.
324, 596 U.N.T.S. 487; Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. Rep.
128, ¶ 153 (Mar. 31); Letter from Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, to Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary
General (Mar. 7, 2005), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87288.pdf.
44 See VAN DER VYVER, supra note 42, at 129–30.
45 See Press Release No. 2014/18, supra note 10.
46 The French Minister of Foreign Affairs submitted a letter to the United Nations Secretary-General on
January 10, 1974, withdrawing French acceptance of the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction. See Nuclear Tests
(N.Z. v. Fr.), Memorial of France, at 2 (Dec. 22, 1974), http://www.amun.org/final/03/ICJ_France_Memorial.
pdf.
47 See Texts Governing the Jurisdiction of the Court, 1946–1947 I.C.J. Y.B. No. 1, at 218 n.1 (noting that
China submitted to the ICJ’s jurisdiction for a period of five years but did not renew at the end of the period);
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 676 (Andreas Zimmerman et al. eds.,
2d ed. 2012) (noting that Russia never submitted to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ and noting
incorrectly that China never accepted the ICJ’s jurisdiction); see also Davis, Hurting More than Helping,
supra note 3, at 104 (detailing China’s acceptance and withdrawal of the Optional Clause).
48 See Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, INT’L CT. JUST.,
http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3 (last visited Jan. 25, 2016) (not listing North Korea and
Israel as countries recognizing the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction).
42
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The United Kingdom is currently the only permanent member of the U.N.
Security Council to submit to the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction.49 The United
Kingdom may withdraw its submission to the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction if
treated harshly by the court in the Marshall Islands’ case, as may India.50 Per
the Marshall Islands’ other cases, even a positive ICJ ruling against the only
NPT party submitting to the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction would likely not be
enforced and may damage the ICJ’s legitimacy if it prompted the United
Kingdom to withdraw from compulsory jurisdiction.51 Losing this sliver of
legitimacy would not benefit the court.52
Even in the Marshall Islands’ only feasible victorious action among its nine
attempts, the net result would likely prove toothless when the United Kingdom
withdrew, and the ICJ would simultaneously lose one more modicum of
legitimacy.53 Ironically, of all the nuclear weapons states, the only nation the
Marshall Islands would have the chance to hold accountable in some fashion is
the United States—perhaps the nation most notorious for avoiding
implementation of international law.54 And, at least in this matter, the only
place in which the United States may have been held accountable is in federal
court.
II. THE MARSHALL ISLANDS IS UNLIKELY TO WIN BEFORE THE NINTH
CIRCUIT, BUT MAY LEAVE A NEGLECTED DOOR AJAR FOR OTHERS
While the Marshall Islands filed a complaint in a domestic court of the
United States under much fanfare, that domestic strategy did not extend to the
courts of any other nuclear weapons state.55 That the Marshall Islands saw an
open window only in America tells a peripheral story about the special
availability of American courts for such matters—historically anyhow.56

49 Stanimir A. Alexandrov, The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: How
Compulsory Is It?, 5 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 29, 31 (2006).
50 See Davis, Hurting More than Helping, supra note 3, at 115.
51 See id. at 115–16.
52 Id. at 82.
53 See id. at 80–81, 115–16.
54 See VAN DER VYVER, supra note 42, at 11–30 (discussing instances in which the United States
declined or refused to implement international law).
55 See In the Courts, NUCLEAR ZERO, http://www.nuclearzero.org/in-the-courts (last visited Jan. 31,
2016) (only mentioning filings before the ICJ and U.S. federal court); Lucy Westcott, Marshall Islands
Nuclear Lawsuit Reopens Old Wounds, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 1, 2014, 10:01 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/
marshall-islands-nuclear-lawsuit-reopens-old-wounds-262491.
56 See generally Complaint, supra note 1.
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The Marshall Islands’ pursuit of declaratory relief may have had potential
if brought apart from the shroud of overreach.57 The injunctive relief was a
pipe dream: not only is the political question doctrine strongest where parties
want to tell a court to force the executive to lead international negotiations, but
this treaty is about multilateral engagement.58 What is more, the Marshall
Islands is pursuing enforcement of a particularly vague provision within an
already vague treaty.59
This Part demonstrates that the Marshall Islands is unlikely to win before
the Ninth Circuit, but may leave a door ajar for future treaty parties to seek
declaratory relief in federal court. So long as the U.S. Supreme Court does not
grant any writ of certiorari sought after the Ninth Circuit ruling, the door will
surely still be cracked for cases in which venue lies outside the Ninth Circuit,
and even inside the Ninth Circuit if the court’s opinion is unpublished.60 At the
least, the declaratory relief method may have potential for future cases.
A. N.D. Cal. Proceedings Throw Out Injunctive Relief, Highlight Roadblocks
to Declaratory Relief
Ultimately, the district court litigation shot down the prospect of injunctive
relief and drew out two stumbling blocks to potential declaratory relief—
standing and political question.61 Potential declaratory relief may exist for
other treaty parties in the future if standing and political questions inherent in
the Marshall Islands litigation are fact-specific to this case. As demonstrated
herein, the Marshall Islands’ standing and political question issues do indeed
seem fact-specific, leaving hope for others to seek declaratory relief under
clearer treaties.

57 See infra Part II.B.3 (noting that the Marshall Islands finally proposes the prospect of being granted
only declaratory relief).
58 See infra Part II.B.
59 See POSNER, supra note 26, at 86 (noting that modern treaties are notably vague, and therefore difficult
to enforce with any specificity).
60 9TH CIR. R. 36-3(a) (“Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court are not precedent, except
when relevant under the doctrine of law of the case or rules of claim preclusion or issue preclusion.”).
61 See generally Republic of the Marshall Islands v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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1. Complaint: Dramatic Overreach Seeking Injunctive Relief
The Marshall Islands’ federal complaint presented an “underlying claim”—
“that the U.S., including by and through its agencies, breached and continues
to breach certain obligations under the [NPT].”62 The complaint sought:
(i)
(ii)

a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 with
respect to (a) the interpretation of the Treaty, and (b)
whether the United States is in breach of the Treaty; and
an injunction directing the U.S. take all steps necessary to
comply with its obligations under Article VI of the Treaty
within one year of the Judgment, including by calling for
and convening negotiations for nuclear disarmament in all
63
its aspects.

2. Motion to Dismiss: A Strategy Primer for Future Cases
The United States filed a motion to dismiss which the court granted.64 The
motion highlighted matters that state parties to other treaties will need to
address in future complaints seeking articulation of American treaty
obligations.65 The United States argued that the Marshall Islands presented no
concrete inquiry, violated the political question doctrine, argued based on a
non-self-executing treaty, filed in an improper venue, and the statute of
limitations barred the suit.66
3. Opposition: Distinguishing “Political Overtones” from Nonjusticiable
Political Questions
The Marshall Islands’ opposition asserted, “Medellín does not bar this case,
where Article VI is an unqualified Executive obligation, and the U.S. has never
claimed that it, or any NPT party, retains the option of noncompliance with
Article VI.”67 Where the United States argued that the entire matter was barred
by the political question doctrine under Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher,68 a
62

Complaint, supra note 1, at 1.
Id. at 6.
64 See generally Republic of the Marshall Islands, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1068.
65 See infra Part III.
66 Notice of Motion to Dismiss at ii, Republic of the Marshall Islands v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 3d
1068 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2014) (No. 14-CV-01885-JSW).
67 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 12, Republic of the Marshall Islands v. United States, 79 F. Supp.
3d 1068 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2014) (No. 14-CV-01885-JSW).
68 Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 6–7, Republic of the Marshall Islands v.
United States, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1068 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2014) (No. 14-CV-01885-JSW). The Ninth Circuit held
63
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1993 Ninth Circuit case concerning statutory provisions protecting sea turtles,
the Marshall Islands retorted that Earth Island was both off point in its focus
on constitutionality (the Marshall Islands made no constitutional challenges to
the treaty), and in its timing.69 Earth Island preceded Zivotofsky v. Clinton,
which held that federal court enforcement of a statute requiring specific action
by the Secretary of State was justiciable because it did not raise a political
question.70 From the Marshall Islands’ perspective, Earth Island was
overturned in any manner pertinent to the present proceedings.71 The state
argued that political question was no bar because the court maintained
responsibility to interpret legal obligations, even when “significant political
overtones” are eminent, citing Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean
Society.72 In Japan Whaling, the U.S. Supreme Court held in part that “[t]he
Judiciary’s constitutional responsibility to interpret statutes cannot be shirked
simply because a decision may have significant political overtones.”73
The Marshall Islands also asserted that venue was sufficiently pled because
all defendants were deemed to reside in the venue and “U.S. nuclear vertical
proliferation occurs” in the Northern District of California, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1391.74
4. Reply: New Territory Highlighted by Non-Binding Citations
The United States filed its Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss in September 2014.75 The memorandum’s language was dismissive,
observing that the Marshall Islands’ “opposition brief does nothing to dispel

that one pertinent statute was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of International Trade, and
that the circuit court could not enforce a statute that would require the court to “compel the Secretary of State
to initiate negotiations with foreign nations on the protection of sea turtles [] [b]ecause ‘the Constitution
plainly grants the President the initiative in matters directly involved in the conduct of diplomatic affairs.’”
Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 6 F.3d 648, 653 (9th Cir. 1993).
69 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 67, at viii, 8.
70 Zivotofsky ex rel Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012). Specifically, the federal statute at
issue required the Secretary of State to note American citizens’ birthplaces on passports and Consular Reports
of Birth Abroad. Id. at 1423.
71 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 67, at viii, 4–8.
72 Id. (citing Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986)).
73 Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 222.
74 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 67, at viii, 13–14. The Marshall Islands asserted that the
United States did not meet its burden to prove that the suit was untimely. Id. at 14–15.
75 See Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 68.
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the extraordinary justiciability concerns presented by the Complaint.”76 The
United States again made five arguments.77
The first three arguments carry broad applicability and will be discussed at
length in Part III. First, the United States argued that the Marshall Islands’
filings failed to allege any “injury in fact sufficient to confer standing,” noting
that any “meaningful relief” for the injuries alleged would hinge on actions of
other nations not party to the case that could hardly be predicted, let alone
controlled.78 Second, standing aside, it argued that the political question
doctrine still barred judicial review.79 Third, it argued that the Marshall Islands
failed to state a claim for relief because their argument was based on a nonself-executing treaty.80
The latter two arguments are fact-specific to the case at hand. As such, they
are not as threatening to future treaty parties seeking declaratory relief in
federal courts. Fourth, the United States argued that any judicially enforceable
rights were pursued in an untimely manner;81 and fifth, that the Marshall
Islands failed to demonstrate a proper venue in the Northern District of
California.82 These factors will not be as thoroughly analyzed as standing and
political question because a party to another treaty could foreseeably present a
timely claim in a proper venue regarding a self-executing treaty. The parties
made additional filings, and some of the Marshall Islands’ supporters filed
amicus briefs.83
The Marshall Islands’ counsel may have believed they had a decent shot at
surviving the motion to dismiss, given the lack of binding precedent on the
matter. The lack of jurisdiction-specific precedent was evidenced by both

76

Id. at 1.
Id.
78 Id. at 1–2.
79 Id. at 1, 5–6.
80 Id. at 1, 10.
81 Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 68, at 1, 14.
82 Id. at 1, 13.
83 See Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 67; Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss, supra note 68; Brief for Tri-Valley CAREs as Amicus Curiae in Support of Venue in the Northern
District, Republic of the Marshall Islands v. United States 79 F. Supp. 3d 1068 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2014) (No.
14-CV-01885-JSW); Brief for Nuclear Watch New Mexico in Support of Plaintiff and in Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Republic of the Marshall Islands v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1068 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-CV-01885-JSW).
77
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parties’ near-entire reliance on decisions from other district courts not binding
on the district in which the complaint was filed.84
5. Ruling: Redress by Injunctive Relief Not Tenable
In January 2015, Judge White expressed a heightened interest in the case.85
Two days before the hearing on the motion to dismiss, he tentatively granted
the motion and expressed that the matter would be decided on the papers.86
Still, the court invited the parties to each present twenty minutes of oral
arguments on five questions issued along with the tentative ruling.87 Not long
after, the court issued a final order granting the motion to dismiss and entering
judgment for the United States.88
Judge White ruled that the Marshall Islands was without standing because
its “injury in fact” was questionable at best, and even if present, could not be
redressed by the injunctive relief requested; and the complaint otherwise
concerned a nonjusticiable political question.89 The court did not reach the
right of action, venue, or timeliness, and declined to articulate the United
States’ obligations under the NPT.90 The Marshall Islands filed notice of
appeal in April 2015.91

84 See Republic of the Marshall Islands v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2015);
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 67; Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss supra
note 68.
85 See Notice of Tentative Ruling and Questions at 1, Republic of the Marshall Islands v. United States,
79 F. Supp. 3d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 14-CV-01885-JSW).
86 Id. at 1–2.
87 Id. at 2.
88 See Republic of the Marshall Islands, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1068.
89 Id. at 1072.
90 While making no pronouncement, the court quoted the U.S. Senate report that accompanied the advice
and consent ratification. See id. at 1070. That report articulated the core purpose of the treaty as slowing, not
stopping, the spread of nuclear weapons, doing so through prohibiting weapon states from transferring
weapons and prohibiting non-weapon states from any path of obtaining nuclear weapons. Id. If this part of the
order were construed as a full articulation of American NPT obligations, the Marshall Islands’ current
arguments would be negated.
91 See Republic of the Marshall Islands v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 14CV-01885-JSW), appeal docketed, No. 15-15636 (9th Cir. Apr. 2, 2015).
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B. Ninth Circuit Filings Focus Questions on Standing, Political Question
Doctrine, and Non-Self-Executing Treaty Status Hurdles to Declaratory
Relief
The Marshall Islands filed its appellant brief in July 2015, and the United
States responded in late October, and the Marshall Islands replied in
December.92 As the appellate matters came into focus, three crucial sets of
legal factors were drawn out—those of Lujan, Baker, and Medellín.93
The Lujan factors establish “the irreducible constitutional minimum of
standing contains three elements.”94 They are:
injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)
concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical,
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained
of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of
the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some
third party not before the court; and
it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury
95
will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”

The Baker factors identify “any case held to involve a political question.”
Notably, Baker made clear that not every case involving a political question
was nonjusticiable.96 The factors for identifying cases involving political
questions are:
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due

92 Brief of Appellant, Republic of the Marshall Islands v. United States, No. 1:15-cv-15363 (9th Cir. July
13, 2015); Brief of Appellee, Republic of the Marshall Islands v. United States, No. 1:15-cv-15363 (9th Cir.
Oct. 28, 2015); Reply Brief of Appellant, Republic of the Marshall Islands v. United States, No. 1:15-cv15363 (9th Cir. Dec. 15, 2015).
93 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
See generally Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
94 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
95 Id. at 560–61 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
96 Baker, 369 U.S. at 211 (“[I]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.”).
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coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
97
various departments on one question.

Medellín, still debated in meaning and scope, stated at the least that non-selfexecuting treaties are not automatically enforceable domestic law.98 This
section imagines that none of these factors would have barred the Marshall
Islands’ claim for declaratory relief if it was sought without a prayer for
injunctive relief, and if injury in fact was met.
1. Appeal: Finally Raising the Prospect of Only Declaratory Relief
The Marshall Islands’ appeal presented two questions on the political
question doctrine, two questions on standing, and a question of declaratory
relief.99 The latter is central to this analysis, boiling down to declaratory relief:
“[s]eparate from injunctive relief, does a court have jurisdiction to interpret the
NPT and determine whether the Executive has breached it?”100 The Ninth
Circuit ruling promises interest, as does whether the court publishes its opinion
to establish binding precedent within its jurisdiction.101 Still, given venue
matters, few future complaints for declaratory relief regarding treaty
obligations would be brought in the Ninth Circuit; thus, even a binding,
published opinion would likely have narrow impact.102
The pertinent Baker questions concern “textual commitment” and
“judicially discoverable and manageable standards.”103 They are: “[d]oes the
Executive power to make treaties override the judicial mandate to determine
cases arising under such treaties, so as to deprive the Court of jurisdiction in
this case arising under the NPT?” and “[i]s there even one judicially
97

Id. at 217.
See BRADLEY, supra note 4, at 48 (“The Court appeared to reject the argument that . . . a non-selfexecuting treaty merely fails to provide a right of action. . . . On the other hand, the opinion also contains
statements that equate non-self-execution simply with lack of judicial enforceability, and the Court’s test for
self-execution appears to focus on whether a treaty is a ‘directive to domestic courts,’ not whether it has the
status of domestic law.”). Contra VAN DER VYVER, supra note 42, at 146 (“The judgment of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Medellín v. Texas (and in Sanchez-Llamas) will not go down in history as the acme of judicial
excellence.”).
99 Brief of Appellant, supra note 92, at 1–3.
100 Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
101 9TH CIR. R. 36-3 (“Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court are not precedent, except when
relevant under the doctrine of law of the case or rules of claim preclusion or issue preclusion.”).
102 See Republic of the Marshall Islands v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
103 Brief of Appellant, supra note 92, at 1–2.
98
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manageable standard to determine whether the Executive has breached NPT
Article VI?”104
Regarding standing, the Marshall Islands presented a two-part question on
injury in fact, and a series of alternative questions on redressability. The injury
in fact questions are peripheral to this Essay because they are fact-specific to
the case at bar.105 The redressability question is prime ground for exploring
future application: “Would compelling the Executive to participate in NPT
Article VI negotiations redress the first injury the Marshall Islands pleaded,
which is the denial of its right to Executive participation in such
negotiations?”106
2. Reply: Focusing on Injunctive Relief as a Bridge Too Far
The United States’ reply addressed standing, political question doctrine, the
non-self-executing nature of NPT Article VI, and declaratory relief.
Per standing, the United States retorted that the Marshall Islands failed to
meet the Lujan requirements.107 Most attention was given to the argument that
mere fear of future nuclear weapons use is not a “certainly impending”
“concrete and particularized injury,” and that any existing injury is beyond the
federal courts’ redress.108 The Government allowed federal courts to maintain
an “indisputably critical role in adjudicating” extradition treaties, and
distinguished those treaties on grounds of their self-executing nature.109 The

104

Id. (internal citation omitted).
See supra Part II.A.4. The Marshall Islands’ injury in fact questions were: “a. Is denial of the Marshall
Islands’ entitlement to the Executive’s participation in disarmament negotiations a sufficient injury-in-fact for
Article III standing? b. Is a measurable increase in current risk from nuclear weapons vertical proliferation a
sufficient injury-in-fact for Article III standing?” Brief of Appellant, supra note 92, at 2–3 (internal citation
omitted).
106 Brief of Appellant, supra note 92, at 2–3 (internal citation omitted). The alternative questions were:
105

b. [W]ould compelling the Executive to participate in NPT Article VI negotiations provide a
sufficient incremental step to redress the second injury the Marshall Islands pleaded, which is the
grave, real, and increased risk from vertical nuclear proliferation? c. Do absent parties preclude
incremental relief to the Marshall Islands, where the Executive has never named an essential,
absent party and the Marshall Islands disputes that there are absent, essential parties for the
claims it pleaded? d. If the NPT is valid, does a court possess the authority to order Executive
compliance with Article VI?
Id.
107
108
109

See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
Brief of Appellee, supra note 92, at 12–29 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
Id. at 54–57.
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role of federal courts in treaty interpretation would be raised within the
Marshall Islands’ political question doctrine questions as well.
As for the political question doctrine, the Government raised two Baker
factors—that the matter is “textually committed to the political branches,” and
that “no manageable standards exist for resolving [the Marshall Islands’]
claims”—and argued that the other four factors generally weighed against
adjudication.110
The Government did not imply the political question doctrine makes a
blanket bar that federal courts can never interpret treaties. To the contrary,
when positing “whether the federal courts can interpret treaties that bear on
civil disputes between private parties, or on criminal appeals,” the Government
answered itself: “[o]f course they can.”111 The Government distinguished the
Marshall Islands’ approach as an attempt to use federal courts to force the
United States into action on grounds of a right granted to the Marshall Islands
by the NPT.112
Leaving further room for the promise of other states parties to other treaties
to bring claims in federal court, the Government’s final arguments were NPTspecific, both directed toward the fifth Baker factor (“an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made”) and the nonself-executing status of the treaty.113 The United States presented a strong case
that the NPT is non-binding in terms of domestic obligation, regardless of
applicable international obligation. Recalling Medellín v. Texas, the
Government regaled the NPT’s ratification history to highlight a lack of
congressional intent for domestic obligation.114
The United States disposed of the Marshall Islands’ declaratory relief claim
in a mere five paragraphs.115 The Government argued that the Declaratory
Judgment Act maintains the Article III case or controversy requirement, and
that the Marshall Islands still lacked such standing. Again, the Government

110
111
112
113
114
115

Id. at 29–30, 40, 44 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
Id. at 37.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 29–30 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
Id. at 48.
Id. at 54–57.
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denied the Marshall Islands’ standing both for lack of case or controversy, and
the bar of the political question doctrine.116
3. Response: Tacitly Admitting the Lost Cause of Injunctive Relief
The Marshall Islands responded only to the matter of the political question
doctrine.117 As the Marshall Islands sees it, “[n]o law elevates the President’s
authority to make treaties above the judiciary’s power to decide disputes
arising under treaties that remain the law of the land.”118 The Marshall Islands’
response highlights both its overreach and its potential success had it merely
aimed for a more realistic sole goal of declaratory relief. Asserting that “the
NPT is multilateral cannot preclude a claim against the United States to
determine the NPT’s legal meaning and address the United States’ own
conduct,” the Marshall Islands is arguably correct on the former, but still
wrong on the latter.119 In a further fact-specific wrinkle that need not rule out
potential declaratory relief for other treaty parties, the treaty language that the
Marshall Islands sought to enforce was vague: “undertake[] to pursue
negotiations in good faith” mandates no formal endgame.120 Moreover, that
provision called for multilateral action such that even an unprecedented
mandate of injunctive relief against the United States could not bring any other
sovereign to the negotiation table, leaving the matter unresolved.121
The end of the Marshall Islands’ response brief asserted, “declaratory relief
can redress a legal dispute ‘whether or not further relief is or could be
sought.’”122 Here, the Marshall Islands finally seemed to tacitly acknowledge a
legal truth that should have directed their strategy all along: injunctive relief
was never available, even if declaratory relief may have been available if
standing was established.123 By grabbing for both forms of relief, the Marshall
Islands alienated its case from serious consideration by the lower court.
116 Id. at 56 (“[P]laintiff’s claims are nonjusticiable because plaintiff lacks Article III standing and its
claims present a political question.”).
117 See generally Reply Brief of Appellee, supra note 92.
118 Id. at 2.
119 Id. at 3.
120 See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 9, art. VI (“Each of the Parties to
the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith . . . on a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control.”); Davis, Hurting More than Helping, supra note
3, at 84 (“The fuzzy language of Article VI, however, creates an uphill battle delineating compliance and noncompliance.”).
121 See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 9, art. VI.
122 Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 92, at 23 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2201).
123 Id.
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In the case at hand, standing probably does bar declaratory relief because
there is no case or controversy, because there is seemingly no available relief
(for fact-specific reasons: the asserted treaty obligation is multilateral and there
is arguably no breach). Injunctive relief was barred not just by political
question, but because even if the judiciary forced the executive to comply,
American compliance would be meaningless: this multilateral treaty’s
provision in controversy requires a number of nations to come to the table, and
a U.S. court has no power to send foreign sovereigns to the negotiation table
over nuclear weapons.124 The district court decided that the NPT did not create
a bilateral obligation between the United States and the Marshall Islands.125
But what if another treaty did? Setting aside the lost cause of injunctive relief,
and admitting that for lack of standing the Marshall Islands’ case is likely
doomed entirely, the next Part will explore the potential for declaratory relief
where treaty parties may have higher hopes for standing.
III. REDRESS, POLITICAL QUESTION, AND NON-SELF-EXECUTING TREATY
STATUS MAY NOT BE CLEAR BARS WHEN ONLY DECLARATORY RELIEF IS
SOUGHT
While injunctive relief appears squarely within the reach of the political
question doctrine, declaratory relief is not so clearly barred. Part II established
that the Marshall Islands’ appeal will likely still fail for lack of standing
regarding injury in fact, and that the pursuit of injunctive relief was an
unfounded exercise in overreach. That said, while the United States wrote its
filings as though the matter was a procedurally open-and-shut case, the cases
the Government cited betrayed its tone. The law is not so settled.126
Part III posits that political question and redressability would not have
barred declaratory relief. What, then, if a treaty party established injury in fact
and only sought declaratory relief? This Part explores the prospect of future
declaratory relief where injury in fact is established. Standing is addressed
first, arguing that declaratory relief establishes sufficient redress to satisfy
Lujan. Political question is assessed next, positing that the Baker factors are
not so broad as to call for abstention from pure declaratory relief. Finally,
124

See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 9, art. VI.
Republic of the Marshall Islands v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
126 Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 68, at 7 (citing cases regarding
political question from the D.C. Circuit, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and the District Court for the
District of Columbia, and citing a single non-binding district case denying an actionable claim under the
Declaratory Judgment Act).
125
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given the conflation of issues in the district court filings, this Part interprets
Medellín v. Texas as not barring mere interpretation of treaties when
enforcement is not at issue.
The legal strategy that the Marshall Islands attempted to bring out of
dormancy may have high hopes for other states party to treaties for which they
would have standing if the United States is in breach.127 Here, though, the
Marshall Islands’ argument for merely prospective injury in fact could hardly
surmount the Lujan standard. Redressability is difficult to imagine because the
American obligation under the NPT is multilateral: a district court could hardly
issue an ex-parte directive to all the NPT parties.128
Notably, any published, binding Ninth Circuit precedent in this case may
have limited impact and would not foreclose declaration of treaty obligations
in other federal jurisdictions.129 The U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia would most likely be the appropriate venue for future treaty parties
seeking a judicial declaration of the United States’ treaty obligations, and
Ninth Circuit precedent would not bind the District Court for the District of
Columbia.130
A. Standing: Declaratory Relief is Sufficient Redress When Injury in Fact is
Established
Of all the Lujan factors—injury in fact, traceable injury, and likely
redress—Marshall Islands v. United States demonstrates that injury in fact and
redressability are most crucial for future treaty parties that may seek
declaratory relief concerning American treaty obligations.131 Leaving injury in
fact to be established by a treaty party on a fact-specific basis, this section
dispenses of the redress factor as a bar to declaratory relief.
The Declaratory Judgment Act, codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2201, prescribes
declaratory judgment as sufficient redress.
127 Complaint, supra note 1, at 1–2 (“[I]t is in no way novel for the U.S. federal courts to interpret a treaty
and/or to find a treaty violation.”).
128 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Republic of the Marshall Islands, 79 F.
Supp. 3d 1068.
129 That is, short of a subsequent U.S. Supreme Court appeal, grant of writ, and opinion in the case at
hand.
130 See Notice of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 66. Notably, Judge White did not address venue in his
order granting the motion. See generally Republic of the Marshall Islands, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1068.
131 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. Traceable injury is presumed, given that an established treaty would
always be in play.
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In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, [tax and trade
exceptions] . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an
appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations
of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not
further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have
the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be
132
reviewable as such.

As this statute conveys, when Article III case and controversy requirements are
met, pure declaratory relief is a final judgment itself regardless of the
availability of other relief.133 Tellingly, the Government’s motion to dismiss
cited a single case to assert that “[t]he Declaratory Judgment Act provides
neither a substantive basis for relief nor a cause of action”—a nonbinding
district court case at that.134 Notably, as the U.S. Supreme Court explained in
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the Declaratory Judgment Act contains
permissive rather than mandatory language for granting declaratory relief,
acknowledging that district courts may provide declaratory relief to treaty
parties but not implying that courts must in every instance.135 Case-by-case
analysis is maintained by the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2201.136 This legal
strategy need not inspire a parade of horribles.
The Northern District of California found that the Marshall Islands “fail[ed]
to account for the fact that the Court cannot mandate specific performance as a
remedy or grant redress for its alleged injury.”137 To be sure, granting the
Marshall Islands’ request for specific performance would be far beyond the
scope of the court’s jurisdiction.138 If the Marshall Islands only sought
declaratory relief, however, the court would have been hard pressed to state
that it could not grant redress for a well-pled injury in fact.
132

28 U.S.C. § 2201 (emphasis added).
Id.
134 Reply Memorandum Supporting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 68, at 10 n.3 (citing Bisson v. Bank of
Am., 919 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1139 (W.D. Wash. 2013)).
135 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 136 (2007).
133

The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that a court “may declare the rights and other legal
relations of any interested party,” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (emphasis added), not that it must do so.
This text has long been understood to confer on federal courts unique and substantial discretion
in deciding whether to declare the rights of litigants.
Id.
136

Id.
Republic of the Marshall Islands v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(emphasis added).
138 See infra Part III.B.
137
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B. Political Question Factors Do Not Bar Declaratory Relief
The district court’s dismissal order leaned on Baker’s political question
standard to disclaim that it “lack[ed] the standards necessary to fashion the
type of injunctive relief” sought.139 Narrowed to declaratory relief, however, a
court would hardly lack a necessary standard.140 Baker contemplates cases that
present nonjusticiable political questions.141 But Baker did not intend to bar all
political questions from federal courts, as the Supreme Court noted: “[I]t is
error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations
lies beyond judicial recognizance.”142 To be sure, there is ample precedent in
which federal courts felt comfortable interpreting treaties outside the reach of
Baker.143 Even in decisions where the Supreme Court did not implement a
treaty, or found that the treaty could not be implemented, interpretation still
occurred.144 Treaty interpretation is not inherently nonjusticiable.145
Cabining off injunctive relief, declaratory relief is little more than treaty
interpretation. Historically, and surely recently, federal courts hardly have
trouble viewing treaty interpretation as justiciable—if a political question at
all.146 Some scholars laud the broader practice of “interpretive enforcement” of
international law, with particular attention to that of treaties.147 Medellín v.
Texas is a prime example of treaty interpretation.148 The Government is
beyond reproach in maintaining that a district court could not require the
executive branch to engage in multilateral negotiations over nuclear weapons,
as the Marshall Islands asked in its lethal overreach.149 That concern need not
139

See Republic of the Marshall Islands, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 1074 (emphasis added).
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012).
141 See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
142 Id. at 211.
143 See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006); Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
144 See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. 331; Medellín, 552 U.S. 491.
145 Hathaway et al., supra note 7, at 87–89 (recalling the history of interpretive enforcement of
international law in federal courts). In the case at hand, it is worth acknowledging the Government’s argument
that, specific to this nuclear-scale case, judicial involvement may be dangerous:
140

[D]etermining whether the United States is currently in breach of its treaty obligations would
require a court to question the propriety of long-term negotiation strategies and choices that have
already been made and may take time to bear fruit. Judicial intervention into these sensitive
political decisions could have unanticipated consequences for ongoing negotiations of which
plaintiff and the court are necessarily unaware.
Brief for Appellee, supra note 92, at 45–46.
146 See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. 331; Medellín, 552 U.S. 491.
147 Hathaway et al., supra note 7, at 87–89.
148 See infra Part III.C.
149 Brief for Appellee, supra note 92, at 29–46.
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be rehashed. Whether the political question doctrine bars any declaratory relief,
however, is a separate matter.
Recently, in Zitovosky v. Clinton, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of
the political question doctrine.150 The Supreme Court offered a reminder that
the political question doctrine is meant to be a “narrow exception” to
justiciability.151 The Supreme Court reiterated that appropriate cases must be
decided even when judges “would gladly avoid” them.152 The Supreme Court
reiterated its definition of political question in Zivotofsky: “a controversy
involves a political question . . . where there is a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.”153
Zivotofsky distinguished federal courts’ enforcing statutory rights from
“supplant[ing] a foreign policy decision of the political branches with the
courts’ own unmoored determination.”154 Where would treaty interpretation
fall along that scale? Admittedly, statutory interpretation is not exactly treaty
interpretation. But perhaps the two are close. If a treaty is signed, the policy
decision and even the legal obligation are already established.155 A federal
court’s interpretation of a treaty is moored by the executive’s decision to sign
it, and where applicable, the legislature’s decision to ratify it.156 Treaty
interpretation is a declaration of pre-existing American obligations—a
“familiar judicial exercise” not unlike statutory interpretation in Zivotofsky.157
As for subsequent foreign policy decisions, whether or how the executive
branch choses to abide by the obligation is its own concern. Again, this Essay
affirms that injunctive relief is clear and understandable territory for
nonjusticiable political question; declaratory relief, though, could be
separate.158
On a second hearing three years later, the Supreme Court decided that the
ultimate issue in Zivotofsky—recognizing a foreign nation—was committed to

150 JARED P. COLE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, R43834, THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE:
JUSTICIABILITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 2 (2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43834.pdf.
151 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012).
152 Id. (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821)).
153 Id. (quoting Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
154 Id.
155 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 509 (2008).
156 See BRADLEY, supra note 4, at 46–48.
157 Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1427.
158 See supra Part II.
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presidential authority.159 The Court arrived at that delineation because “[t]he
weight of historical evidence indicates Congress has accepted that the power to
recognize foreign states and governments and their territorial bounds is
exclusive to the Presidency.”160 The weight of historical evidence does not so
strongly favor reserving treaty interpretation from federal courts.161 If nothing
else, a party could seek declaratory relief as to whether a treaty is selfexecuting.
C. Medellín Articulated an “Obligation to Interpret” and Arguably Limits the
Self-Executing/Non-Self-Executing Test to Treaty Enforcement
While both parties’ filings made much ado over the self-executing or nonself-executing status of the NPT, that distinction may not matter when only
declaratory relief is sought.162 There is a difference in treaty enforcement and
treaty interpretation such that Medellín and even Baker could bar injunctive
relief without barring declaratory relief. Medellín may be interpreted as
cabining off only enforcement of non-self-executing treaties.163 Medellín is
further distinct for addressing private actions of individual citizens rather than
the government, as the district court acknowledged.164 The pertinent distinction
may be between treaty interpretation and enforcement.
In Marshall Islands, the Northern District of California dismissed any selfexecuting treaty doctrine in a single footnote within its political question
section.165 The court found that “the issue of whether the [NPT] is selfexecuting or provides a private right of action is irrelevant to the enforcement
by a state-party that is a signatory to the Treaty.”166 That analysis is mostly
correct and raises a notable flag. The private right of action matter is surely

159

Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2094 (2015).
Id.
161 See BRADLEY, supra note 4, at 46–48.
162 See Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, supra note 67, at viii, 8–12; Reply Memorandum in Support
of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 68, at 10; Hathaway et al., supra note 7, at 89 (“Interpretive enforcement
may extend to non-self-executing treaties as well as self-executing treaties.”).
163 See William J. Carter, Jr., Treaties as Law and the Rule of Law: The Judicial Power to Compel
Domestic Treaty Implementation, 69 MD. L. REV. 344, 346 (2010). Carter takes the matter beyond
interpretation, reaching non-self-executing treaty enforcement: “even non-self-executing treaties are amenable
to domestic judicial enforcement in a manner consistent with both separation of powers principles and the rule
of law.” Id.
164 See Republic of the Marshall Islands v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1078 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(“[A] private right of action is irrelevant.”).
165 See id.
166 See id. (emphasis added).
160
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moot for a treaty party. The self-executing nature of the treaty, however, is
probably pertinent only to whether the treaty may be enforced. This section
contends that Medellín’s distinction applies only to treaty enforcement.
Because the pursuit of pure declaratory relief seeks not enforcement—only
interpretation—the Medellín distinction need not apply.
Medellín not only interpreted U.S. obligations under a treaty, but Chief
Justice Roberts’ majority opinion characterized the exercise as an “obligation
to interpret treaty provisions to determine whether they are self-executing.”167
In an admittedly multifaceted case, but one that ultimately focused largely on
interpreting the Vienna Convention, the phrase “political question” appears in
neither the opinion, concurrence, or dissent; nor is Baker cited anywhere.168
Medellín highlighted the distinction between self-executing and non-selfexecuting treaties.169 The opinion defined “self-executing” in a footnote:
The label “self-executing” has on occasion been used to convey
different meanings. What we mean by “self-executing” is that the
treaty has automatic domestic effect as federal law upon ratification.
Conversely, a “non-self-executing” treaty does not by itself give rise
to domestically enforceable federal law. Whether such a treaty has
domestic effect depends upon implementing legislation passed by
170
Congress.

Notably, the opinion’s engagement of “self-executing” matters continually
referenced the distinction relative to enforcement—something greater than
mere interpretation.171
Similarly, in 2009, the Ninth Circuit leaned on a non-self-executing treaty
to guide statutory interpretation.172 Not enforcement, but interpretation. Given

167

Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 514 (2008).
See generally id. (Roberts, C.J., for the majority; Stevens, J., concurring in judgment; Breyer, J., with
Souter, J., and Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
169 Medellín did not create the self-executing distinction, only brought it back to the forefront of jurists’
minds. See id. at 504–05. Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion cited decisions as old as 1829 that made similar
distinctions. Id. (citing Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 315 (1829), United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51 (1833),
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)).
170 Id. at 505 n.2 (emphasis added).
171 “But not all international law obligations automatically constitute binding federal law enforceable in
United States courts.” Id. at 504 (emphasis added). “When, in contrast, ‘[treaty] stipulations are not selfexecuting they can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect.’” Id. at 505 (quoting
Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194) (emphasis added).
172 Hathaway et al., supra note 7, at 89 (citing Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773, 783 (9th Cir. 2009)).
168
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this precedent, granting declaratory relief for self-executing and non-selfexecuting treaties is hardly a stretch.
Those quick to throw out other treaties alongside the Vienna Convention in
the style of Medellín should also recall that Medellín was partially hung on the
private nature of the right sought to be enforced. The Roberts majority noted:
“Even when treaties are self-executing in the sense that they create federal law,
the background presumption is that international agreements, even those
directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights or
provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts.”173 To be sure, no unenumerated private rights are created by self-executing treaties; but the matter
of sovereign treaty parties seeking declaratory relief is distinguishable.174
Despite the general futility of the Marshall Islands’ litigation, the campaign
still offers a glimmer of hope for others’ future action in federal court.
CONCLUSION: EVEN IF THESE SUGGESTIONS PROVE UNTENABLE, SOME NEW
PATH FOR TREATY ACCOUNTABILITY SHOULD BE FORGED
Looking to the prospect of treaty parties seeking declaratory relief in
federal court, the Marshall Islands’ fifth appellate question is most
provocative: “Separate from injunctive relief, does a court have jurisdiction to
interpret the NPT and determine whether the Executive has breached it?”175 In
the immediate case, the answer is most likely, “yes, a court does have such
jurisdiction, when standing is established; otherwise, absent an Article III case
or controversy, the court’s judgement would be an advisory opinion.”176 Injury
in fact may be a bridge too far for Article VI of the NPT and its vague call to
multilateral action. But there is hope for action regarding an alleged breach of
another provision of a separate treaty, in which injury in fact could be readily
established.

173 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 506 n.3 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 907, cmt. a (1986)).
174 See id.
175 Brief of Appellant, supra note 92, at 3.
176 See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126–27 (2007). “The federal Declaratory
Judgment Act was signed into law the following year, and we upheld its constitutionality in Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937). Our opinion explained that the phrase ‘case of actual controversy’ in the Act
refers to the type of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ that are justiciable under Article III.” Id. (internal citations
omitted).
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Having dealt with the redressability matter of standing, and distinguished
injunctive relief from declaratory relief for both political question and selfexecution doctrine purposes, a treaty party that could establish injury in fact
may have a hope of declaratory relief in federal court. Again, if Medellín is
more broadly interpreted, this promise may be limited to self-executing
treaties; even then, Medellín itself pronounced an obligation of federal courts
to assess whether treaties are self-executing.177 That in itself is some modicum
of declaratory relief.
Given the broad record of American noncompliance with treaties, and the
futile outcomes of Nicaragua and Avena, this route may be a worthwhile
option for engaging the American government in discussions on treaty
obligations—and a fruitful first resort for seeking American treaty
compliance.178
To be fair, in the case of some major powers—the United States included—
some of what is deemed exceptionalism is a genuine function of federalism
rather than any malicious elitism, and is not likely to change anytime soon.179
That natural limitation on major powers’ public international law engagement
presents all the more reason for good faith engagement wherever possible.180
Even if the theories and methods presented in this Essay are ultimately
unfeasible, some new method must be found. This endeavor is part of what
should be a good faith effort to comply with international legal obligations that
the United States chose to take on itself. In a different vein, perhaps treaties are
not the wave of the future. Some academics present strong indictments against
the efficacy of treaties, while others posit circumventing the Treaty Clause
entirely, given the trouble in American procedure.181 Still, for now, there
177 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 514 (“Given our obligation to interpret treaty provisions to determine whether
they are self-executing.”).
178 See BRADLEY, supra note 4, at 44–49; supra Part I.B. Ironically, this strategy is being tested for
modern utility on one hot-button issue of international law where the United States is in as much compliance
as anyone could realistically expect. See supra Part I.A.
179 See Davis, I, Too, Sing America, supra note 2, at 123 (highlighting seeming exceptionalism as a
benign function of federalism); see also BRADLEY, supra note 4, at 58–62. Making insular matters worse,
American scholars hardly even engage in comparative analysis. See Davis, I, Too, Sing America, supra note 2,
at 123 n.7. For an applicable sentiment broader than public international law, see Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Unexceptionalism, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2007), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/11/
unexceptionalism/306306/.
180 One jurist observed a “broad popular sentiment that the land of Jefferson and Lincoln has nothing to
learn about rights from any other country.” Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Brave New Judicial World, in AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 277 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005).
181 See generally POSNER, supra note 26 (discussing the efficacy of treaties); Oona A. Hathaway,
Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J.
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should be a clearer path forward for dealing with treaties currently on the
books. As the Marshall Islands’ present litigation illustrates, one potential
avenue for meeting others halfway may be permitting treaty parties to seek
declaratory relief in federal courts for interpretation of American obligations
under a treaty.

1236 (2008) (describing ending the treaty process as “charting a course toward ending the Treaty Clause for all
but a handful of international agreements”).

